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Melbourne, Australia, nbek@unimelb.edu.au 
Graeme Shanks, Department of Computing and Information Systems, University of 
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Abstract 
Trust and formal controls are critical in contemporary information systems outsourcing 
arrangements. Trust has been recognized as the relationship facilitator, while formal controls have 
been treated as the governance mechanism. Achieving a balance between trust and formal controls 
has received much attention in the literature as it leads to better management of inter-organisational 
relationships and performance results. Although existing research on the balance offers interesting 
insights, it is largely descriptive and does not establish a sound conceptual base. In contrast, the 
current studies that investigate the interaction of trust and formal controls have been based on 
contradictory conceptualisations and conflicting research outcomes, leading to controversial and 
exhausting debate about trust and formal controls being complements and/or substitutes. In this study, 
we investigate the dynamics of trust-controls nexus in IS outsourcing arrangements and build a 
conceptual framework that captures various interplays between trust and formal controls. We argue 
that different types of balance (antithetical, orthogonal and synergistic) and outsourcing outcomes can 
mutually influence each other. Based on our framework, we explore the synergistic balance in two 
case studies and reveal the existence of dynamic patterns of interaction between trust-controls nexus 
and outcomes, and the changes in the achieved balance. The study provides a new way to explore the 
balance as the outcome of dynamic interactions between trust and formal controls and its link to the 
outcomes in IS outsourcing. 
Keywords: Trust, Formal controls, Balance theory, IS outsourcing. 
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1  INTRODUCTION 
Trust and formal controls are both important in the management of IS outsourcing arrangements, 
influencing both the quality of service and the quality of working relationships. Outsourcing practices 
(e.g. business process outsourcing) place a strong emphasis on nurturing trust-building using both 
formal and relational governing skills within outsourcing arrangements (Goo & Huang 2008). Both 
trust and formal controls are important strategic assets in managing IS outsourcing relationships 
between clients and vendors (DiRomualdo & Gurbaxani 1998).  
Outsourcing as a means of meeting organisational information systems (IS) needs is now a commonly 
accepted and growing practice, and one that is continually evolving (Dibbern et al. 2004; Lacity et al. 
2010). As a business practice, it consists of an external vendor providing services to a client to 
supplement or replace internal efforts for an agreed fee over an agreed period (Lacity & Willcocks 
2009). Although the development of outsourcing relationships has received growing attention both in 
industry and in academia, the effective management of IS outsourcing continues to be a challenge for 
organisations. One of the major issues that both clients and vendors are facing is to demonstrate the 
value of outsourcing (Lee et al. 2008). Building and sustaining a flexible relationship between two 
outsourcing parties is one way to create value and achieve business benefits (Willcocks & Kern 1998). 
Improving the quality of outsourcing relationships is important in meeting the outsourcing challenge 
(Lee et al. 2003) and influences outsourcing effectiveness (Goo & Nam 2007).  
There are two prevailing perspectives in managing inter-organisational relationships which are widely 
employed: formal controls and relational governance (Poppo & Zenger 2002). Formal controls are 
represented by a written legal agreement (contract) and formal mechanisms designed to regulate an 
outsourcing partner’s actions to achieve specified objectives (Choudhury & Sabherwal 2003; Goo 
2008). Relational governance is driven by unwritten and largely unspoken sets of expectations held by 
the parties about each other’s obligations and prerogatives (Koh et al. 2004; Prifling et al. 2009), and 
is supported by trust (Sabherwal 1999). Trust is a key factor in managing IS outsourcing and it 
facilitates the development of outsourcing relationships and encourages both clients and vendors to 
cooperate (Kern & Willcocks 2000). 
The ever-growing complexity of business activities emphasizes the importance of building and 
maintaining sound business relationships. Many researchers recommend a cooperative partnership 
between the client and the vendor (e.g. Fitzgerald & Willcocks 1994; Lacity & Willcocks 2009) based 
on an effective and flexible relationship, in which trust positively influences the success of the 
outsourcing deal (Cong & Chau 2007; Lee et al. 2008; Sabherwal 1999). Both trust and formal 
controls should be the centrepieces of a good outsourcing relationship. Overreliance on formal 
controls may be expensive and complicated (Goo et al. 2009), and may have a detrimental effect on 
the relationship. A strained relationship can detract significantly from the success of outsourcing. The 
value, in terms of cost reduction, increased innovation and improved flexibility, of outsourcing is 
reduced by the greater need for excessive monitoring and reporting. Therefore, trust and formal 
controls complement each other in managing IS outsourcing arrangements and should serve as two 
sides of ‘the same coin’, i.e. as they are in a dialectical relationship (Heiskanen et al. 2008; Möllering 
2005).  
Trust and formal controls are both essential (Barthélemy 2003; Mao et al. 2008; Sabherwal 1999), and 
can serve as both complements and substitutes (Goo et al. 2009; Poppo & Zenger 2002; Tiwana 2010), 
in achieving better quality of service and working relationships. Effective collaboration between 
outsourcing partners requires alignment of both interests and behavioural actions (Mani et al. 2006). 
While formal controls attempt to align incentives and interests in providing an administrative 
architecture (Gulati & Singh 1998) within which an outsourcing partnership proceeds, trust addresses 
how the information exchange between the client and the vendor promotes a shared understanding of 
the project requirements and mutual adjustment to align actions to ensure success (Poppo & Zenger 
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2002; Ring & Van de Ven 1994; Zaheer & Venkatraman 1995). The benefits of combining trust and 
formal controls are acknowledged in current outsourcing research. However, scholars have not yet 
gained a thorough understanding of the nature of these conjoint actions, nor explained the complexity 
of the combination of trust and formal controls (Huber et al. 2011). In particular, there are a very 
limited number of studies that consider the appropriate balance between formal controls and trust in IS 
outsourcing (Sabherwal 1999) and none of a conceptual nature that explain how balance leads to the 
outcomes achieved. An appropriate balance between trust and formal controls has strategic value, 
since it helps participating organisations to avoid higher costs, operational disruption, and loss of 
business opportunities (Goo & Huang 2008). This study explores the research question of how and 
why does the balance between trust and formal controls influence outcomes in IS outsourcing. In 
doing so, the study seeks to contribute to the existing IS outsourcing literature in two ways. First, the 
developed conceptual framework on balance allows for a more detailed examination of the interaction 
between trust and formal controls. Second, the findings of the study substantiate the view that trust-
control nexus has a dynamic nature and depending on the patterns of interplay may influence the 
outsourcing outcomes differently.  
The paper is structured as follows. First, we discuss relevant background literature on trust and formal 
controls in IS outsourcing, and conceptualise the balance between them. We define three types of 
balance: synergistic, orthogonal and antithetical and build the conceptual framework. We then 
describe the details of the chosen research approach. In the following section we describe two case 
studies conducted for the synergistic balance. The outcomes and insights from the two case studies are 
then discussed. The concluding section sums up the implications of this study for both researchers and 
practitioners, outlines limitations and suggests several areas for future research.  
2 THEORY BACKGROUND 
This section provides an overview of the background literature on formal controls, trust and the 
interaction between them. We highlight the importance of the balance between trust and formal 
controls and define three types of balance for IS outsourcing arrangements. Also, this section 
explicates the use of the conceptual framework in capturing the dynamic patterns of trust and formal 
controls and its effects on outcomes.  
2.1 Formal Controls 
IS outsourcing is a boundary-spanning interorganisational relationship, where a contract (including a 
service level agreement (SLA)) defines the formal outsourcing arrangement and structures the 
interactions between clients and vendors. The outsourcing contract provides a legally binding 
institutional framework in which each party’s rights, duties, and responsibilities are codified and the 
goals, policies, and strategies underlying the arrangement are specified (Gottschalk & Solli-Saether 
2005). Clearly, the contract plays a key role in defining the outsourcing relationship and as a result, 
most research on contractual issues is related to the building and structuring of outsourcing 
relationships. The SLAs are drafted to efficiently manage outsourcing relationships (Goo et al. 2009) 
and both parties jointly define goals, responsibilities and service levels. The outsourcing contract is 
intended to reduce opportunism and facilitate business exchange between two partners. However, 
contracts often prove to be incomplete (Kern & Willcocks 2000) and many are either too loose or too 
inflexible (Lacity & Willcocks 1998). Among most common types of outsourcing contracts are fixed-
cost, fee-for-service, time-and-materials and strategic partnership (Lacity & Willcocks 1998), where 
each type depends on the nature of the service that is being outsourced. However, contracts cannot 
provide solutions to all problems and undue dependence on them may only create additional problems 
in the relationship. Therefore formal controls based on joint understanding are preferred to 
complement the regulating role of contracts. 
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There has been an extensive research done on the role of formal controls in IS outsourcing 
(Choudhury & Sabherwal 2003; Gopal & Gosain 2009). Formal controls usually include a set of 
mechanisms that are aimed at either regulating the behavior of individuals (and groups) involved in 
the project (e.g. development methodology) or outcomes of the project (e.g. target milestones). In this 
study, formal controls have both an assessment role (assessing project outcomes) and a behaviour role 
(e.g. coordinating the project team) (Choudhury & Sabherwal 2003). Kirsch (1997) defines ‘control’ 
as an attempt to ensure individuals in organisations act in a manner consistent with organisational (and 
project) goals. This definition has been extended for IS outsourcing, where control is exercised by the 
client to ensure the vendor’s behaviour is appropriate. When successfully implemented, these controls 
result in the regulation of behaviour and may change throughout the course of the outsourcing project.  
Formal controls are defined within the outsourcing contract (including the SLA) as a set of formal 
mechanisms. Important aspects of the outsourcing contract include completeness in terms of the scope, 
budget and specified terms (e.g. service levels, benchmarking) and the type of contract (e.g. fixed cost, 
time-and-materials). Formal controls may include mechanisms for assessing outcomes and 
coordinating the behaviour of the vendor team and the overall project.  
2.2 Trust 
Trust has been widely recognized as a facilitator of successful relationships between buyers and sellers 
in many domains from social exchange to economics (Goles & Chin 2005). It is considered one of the 
most desired qualities in any close relationship and includes common features such as positive 
expectations, vulnerability and risk-taking behaviour (Mayer et al. 1995). Trusting parties act 
predictably, fulfill their obligations and behave fairly even when the possibility of opportunism is 
present (Zaheer et al. 1998). Outsourcing researchers mainly focus on trust at the organisational level 
(Oza et al. 2006) and define trust as the belief that a promise is reliable and will be fulfilled (Kern & 
Willcocks 2000). Trust refers to the relational aspects of IS outsourcing, where parties are willing to 
accept risk for commitments that will result in positive outcomes (Willcocks & Kern 1998). Trust 
often leads to success in IS outsourcing (Lee & Kim 1999).  
In the management of outsourcing relationships, trust has a number of long-term benefits, including 
enabling parties to focus on long-term objectives and suppressing the risk of opportunism (Zaheer et 
al. 1998). Trust increases the level of cooperation between the client and the vendor, enabling risk-
taking and reducing conflict. While almost all outsourcing relationships are based upon contracts, it is 
impossible to cover all contingencies in the contracts. Hence there will be reliance to some degree on 
trust-building between the client and vendor. Many outsourcing relationships are formed among 
parties who are initially unfamiliar with each other, and under these circumstances, some initial trust-
building mechanisms are required, since the parties have not worked together long enough to develop 
a history of interactions (McKnight et al. 1998). Openness and honesty, good performance, 
competence and knowledge, predictability, joint understanding and commitment have been 
acknowledged as trust-building characteristics in outsourcing arrangements (Babar et al. 2007; Oza et 
al. 2006) and as relationship characteristics overall (Zaheer et al. 1998). Trust may change as the 
outsourcing arrangement evolves, due to changes in personal, organisational and other conditions of 
the working environment. 
Overall, trust is characterised as the sentiment that prevails in those situations in which outsourcing 
parties have positive expectations of each other’s actions and that each party will fulfil its obligations 
according to the formal agreement to build satisfying outsourcing relationships. Thus, trust-building is 
closely associated with the performance function to deliver as per project requirements and behaviour 
actions to voluntary take corrective actions and acting openly in dealings.  
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2.3 Interaction between Formal Controls and Trust 
Ideally, trust and controls are balanced in such a way that both the client and the vendor are confident 
that the relationship will be so beneficial to them that they are willing to continue the deal and will be 
satisfied with the outcomes (Heiskanen et al. 2008). While both trust and formal controls affect the 
achievement of objectives in interorganisational relationships, Long and Sitkin (2006) point out that 
while “there are numerous examples in the literature where control chases out trust and situations in 
which trust seems to remove the necessity for control, there are equally as many examples of trust and 
control being complementary” (p. 91). Others claim that control mechanisms and trust can be pursued 
simultaneously, and hence are complementary (e.g. Zaheer & Venkatraman 1995) or argue that 
controls are detrimental to trust (e.g. Gulati 1995), since a reliance on controls will diminish trust-
building. Trust and formal controls can be both complements and substitutes (Goo et al. 2009; Poppo 
& Zenger 2002). The ‘complementary’ perspective suggests that trust and controls can be mutually 
reinforcing and can both contribute to the level of cooperation in the relationship, while the 
‘substitution’ perspective suggests that trust and formal controls are inversely related, so that more 
controls require less trust, and vice versa. Thus, the higher the degree of trust in relationships, the 
lower the monitoring costs and other control mechanisms (e.g. frequent reporting).  
As Cullen et al. (2005) argue there is abundance of options as to how to configure the client-vendor 
outsourcing relationships. The client is trying to find the optimal kind and level of trust and formal 
controls to safeguard oneself against any possible risks and opportunistic behaviour of the vendor and 
vice versa. So trust entails that the client is confident that the vendor will deliver what has been 
stipulated in the contract, deal with issues, and be upfront in dealings. Control is the other side of the 
coin (Möllering 2005). Good controls means that the controller can be reasonably confident that no 
major, unpleasant surprises will occur, while establishing control mechanisms ensures the attainment 
of desirable outcomes and reduces the level of risk (Das & Teng 1998) in such a contingent 
environment such as IS outsourcing. Thus, it is reasonable to pursue the notion of balance that tackles 
with the dynamics of the client-vendor relationship development. Complete reliance on formal 
controls does not promote the achievement of objectives between two parties and may result in 
relationship deterioration between the parties (Goo et al. 2009). Similarly, exclusive reliance on trust 
is also risky (Sabherwal 1999). In essence, we argue that there should be a balance between trust and 
formal controls since the dominance of either trust or formal controls leads to unnecessary challenges 
with performance milestones, lack of vision or the risk of opportunism. 
Sabherwal (1999) empirically revealed the importance of finding an appropriate balance between trust 
and formal controls in achieving good IS outsourcing performance. However, he did not provide a 
theoretical explanation of how trust and formal controls interact with each other and how balance 
influences the outcomes. This informs the research question that we address in this paper: How and 
why does the balance between trust and formal controls influence outcomes in IS outsourcing? 
We deliberately decided to theorise formal controls and trust (as attribute of relational governance). 
Trust is a trait embedded in every exchange relationship and a necessary condition for relational 
governance (McKnight et al. 1998; Zaheer et al. 1998). Once exchange partners are granted 
‘trustworthy’ status, they are expected to behave accordingly in the future. We draw on relational 
contract view (Macneil 1985) and consider formal controls and trust to be independent dimensions 
(Goo et al. 2009). This posits that apart from the legal role of contracts (and associated controls), the 
relational attributes of contracts are important since the contract encourages participation and 
exchange by promoting reciprocity and trust-building. It promotes trust as a relational attribute and 
views inter-organisational relationships as the deliberate cooperation of both parties to achieve goals.  
2.4 Theory on Trust-Controls Balance 
To explore the concept of balance, we draw on organisational theory on the balance between trust and 
controls in employer-employee working relationships (Long & Sitkin 2006). From this perspective, 
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organisations achieve a balance when there is a harmonious integration that facilitates the ongoing 
development of working relationships and enhances the task outcomes. The integration is determined 
by the context within which that integration occurs. We adapt Long and Sitkin’s concept of balance 
between trust and formal controls in the context of IS outsourcing. Balance may be understood as 
something akin to a ‘comfort zone’. When it is reached, both clients and vendors agree that the 
outsourcing arrangement is progressing well. Since we posit that histories of two things (trust and 
formal controls) are not independent on each other, balance is the outcome of their dynamic 
interaction and association between them, when one instance in a thing (a particular trust-building 
strategy) interacts with at least one instance in another thing (a particular formal mechanism) (for 
further details, see Weber 2012). 
We argue that the balance between trust and formal controls influences the outcomes in IS outsourcing 
relationships and in turn, the outcomes may influence the state of the achieved balance (see Figure 1 
below). Although we recognise three types of balance (antithetical, orthogonal and synergistic, 
depending on the interactions between trust and controls) defined by Long and Sitkin (2006) for 
employee-employer relationships, we only include synergistic balance in this study. We also argue 
that while balance may appear static for some time in an outsourcing relationship, it is dynamic and 
may change over time (Long & Sitkin 2006) due to the changing nature of the IS outsourcing 
environment (e.g. restructure within project teams, changes to IS project requirements) and changes to 
the size and complexity of the IS outsourcing agreement. Trust and formal controls are also dynamic 
concepts and may change over time as the outsourcing relationship evolves. Parties in the outsourcing 
agreement will be continuously seeking an appropriate balance between trust and formal controls to 
ensure successful outcomes. However, our theory’s boundary condition is that the balance is taken 
from a client’s perspective on the change in the balance and the outcomes within the progress of the IS 
outsourcing arrangement.  
 
 
Figure 1. Conceptual Framework 
To a great extent the definitions of trust and formal controls are case specific and may involve various 
control and trust-building initiatives. In essence, the balance is the outcome of dynamic interactions 
between trust and formal controls. Depending on the integration, trust and controls can act as 
substitutes (antithetical balance), complements (orthogonal balance) and complements with reciprocal 
patterns (synergistic balance). Despite our focus on synergistic balance, we provide brief definitions 
for the remaining types of balance.  
Antithetical balance (AB) involves the development of either trust or formal controls, but not both 
simultaneously. In antithetical balance, trust and formal controls are viewed as substitutes for each 
other. Antithetical balance may involve formal controls only, in short-term projects requiring only 
target deliverables and coordination but not comprehensive relationship development. Stakeholders 
will often avoid implementing trust in these situations, as it involves more cost and risk (Long & 
Sitkin 2006). It should be noted that some level of trust will exist (e.g. swift trust among team 
members in temporary project engagements), but formal controls will have the dominant role. 
Antithetical trust is also possible in short-term projects between stakeholders who have an existing 
trusting relationship, and consider formal controls unnecessary. 
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Orthogonal balance (OB) involves both trust and formal controls, but they are independent of each 
other. Usually this type of balance occurs, when both outsourcing parties may have existing trusting 
relationships, yet they insist on strict project coordination and adherence to the contract. Orthogonal 
balance is also evident when, despite the presence of trust between the client and vendor, the client 
may decide to implement new formal controls (e.g. collecting customer feedback to assess interim 
deliverables). Implementing new formal controls within an outsourcing agreement has little regard for 
the maintenance, dissolution or augmentation of any trust that may exist between the parties.  
Synergistic balance (SB) involves both trust and formal controls, which are “mutually reinforcing and 
where each…facilitates and contributes to the effectiveness of the other” (Long & Sitkin 2006, p. 92). 
Synergistic balance is used to reinforce the strengths of particular types of controls or trust-building. 
For example, when increasing performance by introducing milestone targets, the level of 
organisational trust might also be increased when the vendor team consistently in meets performance 
targets. Furthermore, the use of legalistic control mechanisms during contract negotiations, such as 
financial rewards for the vendor and contractual safeguards for the client, can increase contractual-
based trust between two parties as they are safeguarded against opportunistic actions (Babar et al. 
2007; Ring & Van de Ven 1994). With synergistic balance, both trust and formal controls may be 
viewed as complementary with reciprocal relationships (Pettigrew et al. 2001). In this study, we focus 
on synergistic balance as the appropriate type of balance since it allows adapting to (contextual) 
changes by changing configurations of trust and formal controls.  
2.4.1 The Mutual Influence of Balance and Outcomes 
Outcomes from IS outsourcing relationships include satisfaction with working relationships in terms 
of durability, cooperation and positive information exchange (Goles & Chin 2005; Kern & Willcocks 
2000), service quality and performance within the project in terms of costs and timely delivery (Gopal 
et al. 2002; Goo & Nam 2007; Goo et al. 2009). Some of these outcomes depend mainly of trust 
(satisfaction with working relationships), while others depend mainly on formal controls (service 
quality and performance). In particular, the interaction between formal controls and trust has been 
examined within the context of IS outsourcing projects (Beimborn et al. 2009; Choudhury & 
Sabherwal 2003; Prifling et al. 2009). Some studies looked at the impact of various formal controls on 
project outcomes, participant behaviour in the development of trust (Langfield-Smith & Smith 2005), 
project efficiency (Gopal & Gosain 2009), vendor profitability (Gopal & Koka 2009), and the overall 
IS outsourcing effectiveness (Balaji & Brown 2010). Other studies looked at the positive role of well-
structured SLAs in managing IS outsourcing relationships (Goo et al. 2009) and the positive role of 
trust in achieving high quality project work (Goo & Nam 2007; Kern & Willcocks 2000; Mao et al. 
2008). Overall, the research on the interaction of trust and formal controls has signified the importance 
on the outsourcing outcomes. However, there is a need to explain how balance affects the outcomes.  
While trust and formal controls are each known to positively influence the outcomes from IS 
outsourcing relationships, we argue their interaction through the concept of balance provides more in-
depth understanding. Different interactions between trust and formal controls (three types of balance) 
may influence the outcomes in IS outsourcing relationships differently. In turn, the outcomes may 
influence the achieved balance as well. The outcomes are produced by the joint efforts of the client 
and the vendor. The outcome for the client is continued delivery and performance by the vendor of 
high quality service work. The outcome for the vendor is remuneration and the possible indirect 
effects in relation to the built reputation and the continued relationship with the client. Also, both 
parties learn from their experiences. With time, it seems reasonable to assume that both parties may 
use their gained status to obtain an ‘optimal outcome’ from their own points of view (Heiskanen et al. 
2008) and thus, may adjust some of the control and/or trust-building activities. As a result, this will 
lead to the change in the state of the achieved combination (Huber et al. 2011). Furthermore, the type 
of balance in IS outsourcing relationships may change over time. For example, there may initially be 
an IS outsourcing relationship that has antithetical balance with formal controls only. As trust 
develops over time, the type of balance might change to become synergistic. In this way, balance 
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should be regarded as a dynamic rather than a static phenomenon, whereas the mutual interaction 
between balance and outcomes is best considered as a ‘process model’ with states of each construct 
being important (they will change over time as they interact with each other). This then leads naturally 
to longitudinal studies of client-vendor IS outsourcing relationships. 
3 RESEARCH APPROACH 
We use an explanatory multiple case study research approach. Case studies are appropriate for the 
study of contemporary phenomena in the real world context, when boundaries between the 
phenomenon and its context cannot be clearly delineated, and they are particularly useful in 
investigating ‘why and ‘how’ questions (Yin 2008). This applies well to IS outsourcing arrangements, 
due to their socio-technical nature. We used theoretical replication and examined two IS outsourcing 
arrangements with the synergistic balance achieved differently between trust and formal controls. The 
current balance in the case studies was identified from initial interviews with key stakeholders and 
involved such characteristics as instances of trust and formal controls, co-existing and mutually 
influencing each other at one point of time, several initiatives concerning trust and/or formal controls 
that changed the working relationship and/or project performance. 
Data collection included semi-structured interviews and access to relevant documents. Interviewees 
were selected using heterogeneity sampling to enable triangulation (Miles and Huberman 1994). We 
conducted seven interviews with key participants for Case 1 and four interviews for Case 2 (see Table 
1 below) over three months (January-March 2009). Each interview lasted about one hour, and all 
interviews were recorded and transcribed. All interviews were conducted using an interview protocol 
including questions about demographics, organisational background and context, the use of formal 
controls, the role of trust, perceptions about the balance between trust and formal controls, and 
outcomes achieved over the time of the IS outsourcing arrangement. Some participants provided 
relevant documentation (e.g. SLA details, project requirements).  
 
Case 
Interviewee roles Total 
interviews Client organisation Vendor organisation 
1 
1. Support Services Leader (one 
person) 
2. Midrange Support Leader 
3. Midrange Support Analyst 
1. Service Delivery Manager (SDM) 
2. Three Team Leaders (data 
warehouse, middleware, web 
applications) 
7 
2 
1. Support Services Leader (one 
person) 
2. Infrastructure Support Leader 
1. Service Delivery Manager (SDM) 
2. Team Leader for Infrastructure 
Support 
4 
Table 1. Data collection details 
Case study data was analysed using thematic analysis, a method for identifying, analyzing and 
reporting patterns (themes) within data (Boyatzis 1998). The researcher identifies the major themes 
and follows them through various iterations of data analysis. For this study, a hybrid data analysis 
approach was used, incorporating both deductive and inductive coding. A general coding template was 
used first to aggregate and classify the data into key categories (e.g. ‘trust’, ‘formal controls’), 
organised around theoretical constructs. Inductive coding was used for data classified within each of 
the key concepts to identify sub-categories. In each type of coding, data was analysed based on 
recurrence and salience rather than frequency (Blatt et al. 2006).  
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4 CASE STUDY DESCRIPTION 
Both case studies involved a large client organisation that provided financial solutions for commercial 
and personal loans, auto loans and leases, and credit insurance (one of four operating divisions, within 
a US-based multinational corporation, with 130 million customers). The client outsourced 70% of its 
IT infrastructure to two different vendors that were selected based on their expertise. In Case 1, the 
vendor is a large Australian ICT company with expertise in strategy and architecture, and application 
development (with over 1000 staff and A$115 mln revenue p/a) and it was responsible for midrange 
application support. In Case 2, the vendor is a large Australian ICT company with expertise in systems 
development and integration (with over 3000 staff and A$504 mln revenue p/a) and it was responsible 
for infrastructure support. Both outsourcing projects involved initial tender bidding and subsequent 
contract renewals. In Case 1, the length of the outsourcing project was 6 years and worth of A$2.5 mln 
p/a, whereas in Case 2 - 5 years and A$5 mln p/a. Both cases involved the synergistic balance, 
however it was achieved differently with various combinations of trust and formal controls.  
4.1 Case 1 
In 2004, both parties signed the fixed fee contract on the midrange application work, comprising the 
24/7 support of the client’s three types of IT systems, i.e. data warehouse, middleware and web 
applications, provided by the vendor. Along with the contract, both parties also defined service targets 
and performance measures in the SLA (e.g. standard delivery reports, internal KPIs, VOC-based 
feedback). The synergistic balance was achieved soon after the contract sign-off, between initial trust-
building and greater formal controls focused around the scope of the project. In fact, despite the early 
team-building efforts and positive information exchange, both parties felt that the project required a 
closer attention around the project scope. By arranging additional reviews initiated by the vendor to 
finalise the number of supported applications, both parties amended the contract and implemented 
service guidelines to add more rigour to prevent further misunderstandings and mitigate any potential 
conflicts between two parties. This positively influenced the development of the working relationship 
between two parties and facilitated the growth of client’s trust towards the vendor’s genuine attitude 
and commitment to the project. 
Later on, when the contract was renewed in 2006, the positive trust-building based on the vendor’s 
strong performance diminished the effect of formal controls. For example, the client’s executive talked 
about the interplay between trust and formal controls by emphasizing the strong performance-based 
trust towards the vendor:  
“I trust this Vendor around their ability to deliver a good service. We’ve had a good definition 
of what they do. We have the right balance, we talk about formal controls every two years when 
we do the contract. We change them, we do the monthly reviews…that’s really around the 
working processes and trusting relationship.” (Support Services Leader) 
Further, the synergistic effect between trust and formal controls resulted in strong perceptions of 
positive outcomes, suggesting that people were satisfied with what they accomplished on both sides:  
“We’ve got a trusting relationship between us and the client; they know that what we’re 
delivering is good value. We’ve achieved a good medium between trust and governance.” 
(Service Delivery Manager) 
At this stage, formal controls were mainly of the regulating nature to monitor the ongoing progress of 
the project. Despite the positive outcomes in the service quality and project performance, the vendor 
voiced some concerns around the operational processes responsible for the handover process between 
the project team and the client’s internal development team:  
“When we’re taking over new applications, when working with the team that’s developing 
them…it’s better if we could spent time with them earlier so that the transition into support 
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becomes smoother…That’s something that will get better over time but it would be good to 
have more strict controls around some of the processes we do.” (Team Leader, Web applications 
team) 
As a result, the client recognised the need to allocate additional human resources to handle the 
transition process (including the formation of the change management team), as well as together with 
the vendor they doubled the support team by allocating people to specifically work on the middleware 
component (now of total 40 people). Further, both parties described the working relationship as open 
and positive, and referred to the existing “informal operating rhythm” around project-related 
communications (e.g. regular feedback meetings, unscheduled catch-ups, tea meetings):  
We’re quite frank with each other, it gets rid of all the rubbish. If there’s problem we’ll talk 
about it…whether it’s painful or not…If we see something wrong, even if it’s detrimental to us, 
we’ll raise our hand and say “There’s better ways of doing this...” Whereas we could just sit 
down and quietly just let it happen around us and deliver a service.” (Service Delivery Manager)  
Such openness and commitment from the vendor side resulted in the growth of client’s confidence in 
vendor’s competence, let alone with the growth of mutual trust based on shared understanding and a 
sense of having a common goal. Subsequently, this resulted even in a stronger effect of the synergistic 
balance, where despite existing formal controls that both parties abide, they still prefer to work 
informally based on open communication and knowledge about each other’s behaviour (e.g. “Vendor 
is pretty across three teams in the way they work and we know that”, Midrange Support Analyst).  
By the time when the contract was renewed for the second time in 2009, both parties acknowledged 
good quality of service (e.g. “technology stability”) and achieved strong relationship quality. With the 
strong trust based on vendor’s performance and gained knowledge about each other’s behavioural 
actions, both parties were able to set balanced negotiations around the contract terms to satisfy each 
other needs in terms of re-negotiating cost of support (for client) and revisiting scope (for vendor). 
Neither performance measures were reviewed, nor status delivery reports were modified, suggesting 
that both parties were happy with the progress of the project and the outsourcing relationship overall.  
4.2 Case 2 
In 2005, the client announced the tender on the infrastructure support work as the result of the 
previous ad-hoc approach used by the internal team of contractors and the need for a consolidated 
system that could be supported by the external service provider. The project work was given to the 
current vendor to ensure availability and reliability of the client’s large storage networks and various 
server platforms. Initially the organisations started operating without a contract due to difficulties in 
wording the scope given diversity in infrastructure technology components. They started working 
together based on ‘good faith’ and with good intentions that led to a verbal agreement about the 
project scope, service targets and pricing, suggesting initial trust-building between the two parties: 
“We agreed on payment terms, we agreed on the services, but it got down to the level of the 
wording...For a year we were trying to work out how to write all that up. That’s a sign of trust. 
Now they’re moving in the right direction.” (Support Services Leader) 
In this case the initial type of balance achieved was antithetical. Both parties relied on trust during the 
first year of operation. At this stage, initial trust-building was largely based on client’s growing 
confidence in vendor’s capability to deliver service as per client expectations. While formal controls 
involved very little documentation around the project (e.g. functional specifications), confused levels 
of responsibility and communication modes. Despite the apparent absence of project governance, the 
vendor showed a genuine interest in the project that positively influenced the initial development of 
the relationship between two parties.  
The antithetical balance evolved into the synergistic balance by the time when the contract was first 
signed in 2006. Along with the contract (based on fixed fee), both parties also formally defined the 
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SLA documentation and standard formal controls such as performance measures (e.g. status delivery 
reports, VOC-based feedback), as well as enhanced support documentation and improved rigour 
around operating procedures:  
“They [Vendor] started to go through this process of sharing knowledge, putting it out on 
paper…The communication’s been improving over time. The reporting has been improving 
over time, the actual operating rhythm and status reports…” (Infrastructure Support Leader) 
It seemed that despite good relationship status and positive knowledge sharing, both parties 
occasionally had certain misunderstandings with regards to project performance. In particular, 
occasional disputes over the contract clauses with regards to the delivery of service triggered the client 
to implement formal controls around project scope (i.e. service catalogue) and project interim 
assessment (i.e. periodic follow-up reviews) throughout 2007 and 2008. This negatively influenced the 
growth of trust between the parties. For example, the client’s executive highlighted the vendor’s 
attitude in the outsourcing relationship:  
“I like our relationships with this Vendor, it’s very open, we talk through issues, they are 
flexible in how they deal with us…We still have conversations “Should you be doing that?”, “Is 
that in your contract?” and this drives down the trust level.” (Support Services Leader) 
Both parties were satisfied with the progress of the project following the introduction of formal 
mechanisms to improve the quality of service. 
“It has improved over time, we are achieving a level of stability that we haven’t had before.” 
(Infrastructure Support Leader) 
Despite occasional disruptions in service provision, both parties were getting mature on service 
delivery and continued building an open rapport through regular meetings both formal and informal 
(e.g. monthly, weekly). However, the synergistic balance remained on the same state between trust 
and formal controls, where formal controls had a greater presence. Besides, the recent changes in the 
client and vendor teams (i.e. new project manager in client team and new service delivery manager in 
vendor team) had brought both teams to restore confidence levels towards each other’s actions and 
focus on building a common goal:  
“If there’s no trust - there’ll be all sorts of controls: defined, very strict. At the moment, it’s not 
that strict. So I guess there’s still that trust there.” (Team Leader for Infrastructure Support) 
The parties renewed the outsourcing contract at the end of 2008. A good level of relationship quality 
was achieved, suggesting that both parties were satisfied working with each other and the success was 
linked to the renewed outsourcing deal.  
5 DISCUSSION 
The study explores the nature of finding the appropriate balance between trust and formal controls in 
IS outsourcing arrangements. A number of insights related to the synergistic balance are evident from 
the case studies. Building the framework on trust-controls balance revealed some interesting patterns 
of interaction, which describe mutually reinforcing and bi-directional impacts between trust-controls 
nexus and outsourcing outcomes. In particular, theorising trust and formal controls as separate 
dimensions that contribute to achieving a balance state will eventually establish a certain path towards 
the outsourcing outcomes (see Figure 2 below). For example, in both case studies, finding the right 
combination of trust and formal controls prevented the outsourcing arrangements from falling apart 
through a well-structured SLA (Goo 2008) and implemented formal controls with the assessment and 
regulating roles (e.g. standard delivery reports, change management team), and thus facilitating the 
growth of trust and commitment in the relationship development (Goo & Huang 2008). Within the 
balance (state 1), the dynamics of trust and formal controls enables the success of the collaboration by 
reducing the level of resistance and bringing harmony to the client-vendor relationship (Das & Teng 
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1998). Both parties achieved desired outcomes without questioning the motives and competence of 
each other (Case 1) and accepting controls in relation to outcome measurements and behaviour actions 
(Case 2).  
 
Figure 2. Generic sequences of interaction patterns between balance and outcomes 
Also, synergistic balance enables adaptation to changes, either in the outsourcing project or to the 
organisations involved. It is a flexible type of balance that can work in dynamic contexts, with 
different interplays between trust and formal controls. For example, in Case 1, a synergistic balance 
was established between trust and formal controls, reinforced by ongoing good performance of the 
vendor. In Case 2, additional controls were implemented (e.g. periodic follow-up reviews) to regulate 
the vendor’s performance. In other words, this combination can be referred to the ‘comfort zone’ 
between trust and formal controls, or what Long and Sitkin (2006) commonly defined as a 
“harmonious integration” (p. 46). There is a synergy between trust and formal controls that leads to 
desirable outcomes for both service quality and relationship development. It is appropriate balance, 
where trust and formal controls act as complements within the outsourcing relationship (Goo et al. 
2009) and with the reinforcing force. If both parties are aware of synergistic balance, they can 
understand that a decrease in either trust or formal controls can lead to rational actions. In other words, 
the synergistic balance acts as a survival mechanism against the odds of IS outsourcing, allowing to 
adapt to the changes in the outsourcing project or behavioural actions of the project teams.  
Moreover, it seems that in the case studies, there was a strong relationship between performance-based 
trust (Sabherwal 1999) and outcome-based controls (Choudhury & Sabherwal 2003). This is 
consistent with Sabherwal’s recommendation (1999) to balance structural controls and trust to 
improve performance in outsourced IS development projects in light of the observation that excessive 
focus on either structure or trust may hurt performance. So this study finds that in well-structured 
outsourcing arrangements, building strong performance-based trust between two parties may reduce 
the pressure of assessment controls (outcome-based controls) and thereby, the combination of and 
positive interaction between the two modes (formal controls and trust), can be a powerful mechanism 
for managing IS outsourcing relationships. 
Further, the outcomes (state 1) may also influence the state of the balance (state 2), either by 
influencing the interactions between trust and formal controls or changing the state of the balance, and 
thereby, creating a new pattern for interaction (Path 2). For example, in Case 2, the balance has been 
observed to be a dynamic and emergent concept that can change over time, as the context of the 
outsourcing relationship changes (e.g. Case 2 when both parties signed the contract and formally 
defined all the service targets, thereby shifted from antithetical to synergistic balance). However, such 
transformation may likely to happen at later stages of the outsourcing arrangement, when the situation 
involved sudden changes in the course of the project (e.g. deterioration in working relationships, 
change in project requirements), and when the working relationship deepens over time with ever 
growing sophistication of enacting trust-building strategies (Lim et al. 2011). These dynamic patterns 
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between the balance and the outcomes resemble the principles of the Newman-Robey social process 
model (Newman & Robey 1992) that shows the relationship between users (in our case - the client) 
and developers (in our case – the vendor) to shape the process. So IS outsourcing arrangements 
progress through time as a series of longer episodes, punctuated by brief (but not necessary present) 
encounters (Heiskanen et al. 2008). In our case, these episodes mark the dynamic interaction between 
balance and outcomes, whereas the state of the achieved outcomes may require implementing new 
initiatives that will transform the operating state of the balance.  
Overall, the key contribution of our framework is that it defines the relationship between trust and 
formal controls as far more complex than it has been indicated by the extant literature (e.g. Goo et al. 
2009; Poppo & Zenger 2002). The higher degree of complexity manifests in two ways. First, the 
relationship between trust and formal controls may change over time, by taking forms of substitution 
(antithetical balance), complementarity (orthogonal balance) or mutual reinforcing complementarity 
(synergistic balance). Second, the bi-directional interaction between the formed balance and the 
outcomes suggests that the time factor is also important since it allows to explore the development of 
balance and its effects towards achieving interim outcomes first and then to track those changes with 
regard to the progress made at various stages of the outsourcing arrangement.  
6 CONCLUSION 
The study advances a new lens on the complexity of the relationship between trust and formal controls 
through the investigation of the balance in two different outsourcing arrangements. The active level of 
balance achieved within the outsourcing environment dynamically changes between trust and formal 
controls accumulated by the outsourcing parties. The case study findings have been discussed with the 
use of the conceptual framework explaining the mutual interaction between the balance and outcomes 
achieved. It proposes a certain sequence of paths of dynamic interaction between the balance achieved 
and the outsourcing outcomes. Although only two case studies were presented to explore the 
behaviour of the synergistic balance, they have revealed a number of insights in relation to the nature 
of the synergistic balance as being appropriate combination between trust and formal controls, that is 
capable to tackle with dynamic changes emerged during the outsourcing arrangement.  
Also, the study has introduced the concept of balance in IS outsourcing relationships and defined three 
types of balance. We argue that understanding the type of balance in outsourcing relations and how it 
evolves over time is significant in achieving success with IS outsourcing. Balance in outsourcing 
relationships is significant for both practitioners and researchers. For practitioners it provides a useful 
lens with which to understand and diagnose outsourcing relationships and should prove useful in 
strategic decision-making by outsourcing managers. For researchers, balance provides a useful new 
way of explaining outsourcing relationships and outcomes developed over time.  
We recognise that this study is subject to limitations, but some of them may be mitigated within our 
future research. First, we use only two case studies to explore a single type of the balance (synergistic 
balance). Although we outlined the explanatory purpose of the multiple case study approach, we 
certainly aim for further replication studies to compare current findings with other studies conducted 
on the orthogonal and antithetical balances, let alone with use of different industry sectors and 
increasing number of case participants for stronger generalisation. This research topic can be further 
pursued with longitudinal case studies that examine the evolution of the balance, with transitions from 
one type of balance to another. Also, adding granularity to the balance topic by building various 
portfolios of trust types and types of formal controls will certainly enrich the study.  
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